Why Lenin openly advocated the defeat of Russia in the First World War

The Great and Forgotten War

August 1, 2014 marks 100 years since Germany declared war on Russia. This war in the memory of generations seemed to be overshadowed by subsequent terrible events: the Civil War and the Great Patriotic War. The war of 1914 was disparagingly called “imperialist” in Soviet historiography; it was usually described as unsuccessful for Russia. But for our ancestors, who shed blood on its fields, it was not “imperialist”, but the Great and Second Patriotic War. And a simple comparison of facts makes us think: was it really that unsuccessful for us? After all, during the First World War the Germans were not allowed either to the Volga or to Moscow, neither Kyiv nor Minsk were given up, military operations were carried out only in the Kingdom of Poland, Western Belarus and the Baltic states. One cannot but agree with a modern historian: “Not a single war in which Russia participated was so disgraced in the popular consciousness through the efforts of the Bolsheviks... Not a single one left such a gaping vacuum, not a single one was so erased in the memory of posterity...”[1].

We talk about the First World War and Russia’s participation in it with Ruslan Gagkuev, Candidate of Historical Sciences, Deputy Editor-in-Chief of the Drofa Publishing House.
— Ruslan Grigorievich, what and why did this war start?
— The First World War, or, as it was initially called, the Great European War, was the result of a huge number of contradictions that had accumulated in the world by the beginning of the 20th century. Two groups of countries opposed it. On the one hand, these were the powers of the Entente (the name comes from the French entente - “accord”) - a military-political bloc of England, France and Russia, which formed in 1904-1907 as a counterweight to the countries grouped around Germany. On the other hand there was the Quadruple Alliance consisting of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria. As the war began to escalate, 38 states were involved in it. None of the world conflicts before it had such a scale.

The German Empire, which emerged rather late as a single state, was actually late for the colonial division of the world. This was the reason that Germany was one of the main initiators of the redivision of the world, which had already been divided. The source of the conflict between the German and Russian empires was both economic and foreign policy contradictions. Many problems have accumulated in relations between Russia and the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

As we know from world history, such tension in relations between the strongest world powers could persist for quite a long time. Russia did not want war. It is no coincidence that P. A. Stolypin, one of the creators of the country’s economic growth, said: “Give the state twenty years of peace, internal and external, and you will not recognize today’s Russia.” The country was developing rapidly, and this development was supposed to make it perhaps the strongest world power.

The reason for the outbreak of war was the assassination of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand (nephew of Emperor Franz Joseph I) on June 15, 1914[2] in Sarajevo by Serbian nationalist Gavrilo Princip. The government of Austria-Hungary, under pressure from Germany, handed Serbia an ultimatum, in which conditions that were actually unacceptable in advance were put forward. Serbia did not accept them, and exactly a month after the fatal shots in Sarajevo, Austria-Hungary declared war on it, starting hostilities.

Russia found itself in an extremely difficult situation. Of course, one could refuse to support a fraternal country in trouble and remain on the sidelines. Emperor Nicholas II, who did everything to avoid war, took a different path. He supported Serbia, which was left alone with its strongest enemy. The Russian government announced partial mobilization in the country. Having begun the secret mobilization and concentration of troops near its borders in advance, Germany unceremoniously demanded that Russia stop the military preparations it had begun. Without responding to this interference in internal affairs, the country continued preparations for war. In response to this, on July 19, Germany declared war on Russia (on July 23, under pressure from the German government, Austria-Hungary also entered the war with Russia). In the following days, most of its main participants, bound by international treaties, entered the war. The main land fronts in the outbreak of the war were the Western (French) and Eastern (Russian). The German Empire hoped to tear away from Russia the part of Poland that was part of it, the Baltic states, and a number of provinces of Little Russia.

— We often hear that Russia had no reason to get involved with the Entente and enter into this war. Meanwhile, Russian intelligence data is known that Germany planned to start a war with Russia in 1915. So did we have a chance to avoid participation in the First World War or was it inevitable due to Germany’s aggressive intentions?

— The international situation is probably never simple. Of course, when concluding an alliance treaty with Russia, both England and France pursued primarily their own selfish interests. As, indeed, is Russia. There were enough contradictions between the allies. However, a potential conflict with Germany and Austria-Hungary was still more likely for Russia. The decade before the First World War was generally extremely difficult for Russian foreign policy. The policy of avoiding war at any cost led to significant defeats in the international arena. Suffice it to recall the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary in 1908 - the “diplomatic Tsushima” of the Russian Empire. The Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, which was unsuccessful for Russia, misled the German Emperor Wilhelm II and his government about the strength of Russian weapons. Russia was not considered a serious adversary.

In Germany, since the 1890s, aggressive circles came to power who considered a war with Russia not only possible, but also profitable. The German press openly promoted the course of an “offensive to the East,” and waged an anti-Russian campaign in which Russia was presented as the main obstacle to the creation of a “great Germany.” Even if Russia had abandoned Serbia to its fate in the summer of 1914, it would have hardly been possible to remain aloof from the international conflict, given the preparations for war that were being carried out in other countries.

— When you read statements on the eve of the First World War by other German professors, politicians, military men about the superiority of the Teutonic race, about the racial inferiority of the Slavs, you get the feeling that German Nazism did not arise out of nowhere and that Hitler had worthy teacher-predecessors. What was the actual moral character of our opponents?

“Preparation for such a big war as Germany was planning, of course, required a certain ideological indoctrination of society. It is obvious that two decades later, before the start of a new world war, the Nazi elite in Germany could not help but use the experience of their predecessors. To characterize the moral state of German society during the First World War, and most importantly, the origin of National Socialism, the feature film by Austrian director Michael Haneke “The White Ribbon - a German Children's Story” (2009) is in many ways indicative. It is quite obvious that the author is trying to show the origins of Nazism in the system of German education and mentality, to tell how evil and violence are brewing in society, the ideology whose founders unleashed the bloodiest war in world history.

Meanwhile, excessive self-confidence ultimately backfired on Germany. Starting the war, the German Empire was guided by the plan of the former Chief of the German General Staff, Alfred von Schlieffen. The plan provided for the lightning defeat of France by German troops. It was important to do this before the time when “clumsy” Russia mobilizes and sends its troops to the front. But the German command failed to implement this plan. The culprit for this was Russia, which managed to launch an offensive in East Prussia in the shortest possible time, at the cost of great sacrifices.

August Icon of the Mother of God.
Written after the appearance of the Blessed Virgin Mary in 1914, in the second month of the war, to Russian troops near the city of Augustow (now the territory of Eastern Poland). On her left hand the Most Pure One held the Divine Infant, with her right hand she pointed to the west. Celebration of September 1/14 - How do you explain the patriotic impulse of Russian society after the start of the war?
After all, the inspiration was indeed enormous: volunteers were rushing to the front, many private hospitals were being created for the wounded, ladies from high society, including the royal family, were working as sisters of mercy... - The main reason that pushed all segments of the Russian population to the front in 1914 was the realization the fact that Germany is the aggressor. The Russian government's determination to preserve peace was well known in society. The threat from the “treacherous Germans” awakened the social instinct of self-preservation in the country’s population. Another reason, which was understandable to the common people, was the need to protect the right to exist of the half-blooded and same-faith Serbian people, sympathy for the younger brother in trouble.

In the manifestos of July 20 and 26, 1914, the sovereign directly outlined the reasons why Russia was entering the war: preserving territorial integrity, protecting the honor, dignity and position of our country among the great powers and Slavic peoples. The very fact that Germany declared war on Russia contributed to the public perception of this war as a domestic war, the main goal of which was to repel aggression. Throughout Russia, priests performed prayers “for the granting of victory over the treacherous and insidious enemy.” Mass marches and demonstrations took place in cities in support of the government, especially powerful ones took place in St. Petersburg and Moscow. It is significant that the very next day after the declaration of war in St. Petersburg, thousands of people gathered on Palace Square to support the authorities. These were representatives of all classes of Russian society: intelligentsia, townspeople, workers, peasants from nearby villages. They all knelt down in unison before the Emperor and Empress who came out onto the balcony of the Winter Palace. Nicholas II read the manifesto to the people about Russia's entry into the war and was the first to solemnly take the oath of office in the Gospel. On August 4, the sovereign and his family arrived in Moscow, on the streets of which he was enthusiastically greeted by about half a million Muscovites and peasants near Moscow. A solemn prayer service “for the glory of Russian weapons” was held in the Assumption Cathedral of the Moscow Kremlin. The fact that society greeted the outbreak of war with a single patriotic impulse is indisputable.

The patriotism of Russian society was also manifested in the readiness of large sections of the population for self-sacrifice. Thus, the first of the wartime mobilizations (there were 19 in total) was not only successful and quick - the turnout of conscripts for it was almost one hundred percent. It also led to the beginning of a mass volunteer movement. Many young people who had a deferment from conscription joined the army. These were students, intellectuals, and workers of defense factories who had reservations. Writers V.V. Veresaev and A.I. Kuprin, poet N.S. Gumilev, and many other cultural and scientific figures voluntarily enlisted in the army. It is significant that even the revolutionaries who were in exile submitted petitions to the authorities, asking to be sent to the active army. It can be said that all layers of Russian society reacted to the outbreak of the world conflict not only with due understanding, but also with a readiness for self-sacrifice.

One of the few exceptions were the Russian Social Democrats. If the leader of the Menshevik faction of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party, G.V. Plekhanov, at the beginning of the war, took a national position and called for a fight against German imperialism, then the same cannot be said about the leaders of the Bolshevik faction. Thus, the leader of the Bolsheviks V.I. Lenin believed that the outbreak of the world war should be welcomed, since defeat in it was a bridge to revolution. According to him, the world war was supposed to develop into a civil war. No one in Russia in 1914 could imagine that just three years later, for various reasons, the mood in society would change so much, and the Bolsheviks would have the opportunity to legally implement their political program to the masses.

— What was the degree of Russia’s readiness for war?

— By 1914, Russia was not fully prepared for a world war. The Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 clearly showed the need to reform and strengthen the army and navy. After the end of the war with Japan, a lot was written about this in the military press. The Russian government has carried out a number of measures aimed at strengthening the country's defense capability: strengthening the combat capability of the army, centralizing the highest military command, reorganizing the army and improving its technical equipment. The military reforms carried out in Russia in 1905–1912 played a positive role in all areas of military affairs. But much of what was planned could not be realized for various reasons. According to the calculations of the Russian General Staff, with the required rates of economic growth, the country would be ready for a large-scale world war by 1917–1919. This unpreparedness was revealed literally at the very beginning of the armed struggle. Logistics and transport networks were the weak points of our active army and rear. The Great Retreat of 1915 was a consequence of the country's insufficient readiness for war. At the same time, the self-sacrifice and heroism of Russian soldiers and officers demonstrated already in the first days of the war, their readiness for heroism in the name of the honor and greatness of the Fatherland, significantly minimized the enemy’s technical superiority.

A poster depicting the feat of the Cossack Kuzma Firsovich Kryuchkov, who destroyed 11 German lancers in a battle with the enemy. Kryuchkov became the first lower rank to be awarded the St. George Cross (IV degree) during the Great War. During the Civil War he fought on the side of the whites. Killed in battle in August 1919 (according to other sources, he was captured by the Reds while wounded and shot)

— All participating countries signed the Hague Convention for the Humane Treatment of Prisoners, but did everyone implement it? What was the reality of the situation of our prisoners in Germany?

— The Russian Empire was one of the initiators of the convening of the Second Hague Peace Conference in 1907, in which 44 states took part. This international forum has adopted 13 Hague Conventions. These conventions, which were based on the principle of humanizing war, were, of course, progressive in nature. However, the most important proposals made in The Hague - on limiting arms and introducing an arbitration court to resolve international conflicts - did not receive the support of the majority of the great powers and, mainly, Germany.

The number of Russian soldiers and officers captured during the First World War was unprecedented for our society. According to the calculations of the outstanding Russian military scientist General N.N. Golovin, a total of about 2.4 million people were captured. Life in captivity during the World War was not easy for anyone. It was, of course, not easy to feed such a mass of mouths for the countries that took them captive, given all the economic difficulties.

Many of the prisoners were involved in various types of work. Cases of prisoners refusing to work, which would be detrimental not only to Russia, but also to its allies in the war, were quite frequent. The report of a Russian military agent in Serbia is indicative. At the beginning of 1915, “seven lower ranks who had escaped from Austrian captivity arrived there... They and their comrades who remained in captivity were forcibly recruited by the Austrian authorities to build fortifications on the Serbian front. In order to force them to work, our prisoners were subjected to severe torture. In this regard, according to senior non-commissioned officer Solovyov and other prisoners from the Dolsk camp (in Slovakia), the brave behavior of the prisoner, private 82nd Dagestan Infantry Regiment Nikolai Alekseev, a Chuvash, deserves mention. For refusing to dig trenches, the Austrians first hung the said lower rank on a string from a tree for 20 minutes, and the Austrian officer with a revolver in his hand constantly threatened him with death. Even the Austrians on guard turned away from this spectacle. When the next day Private Alekseev refused to dig trenches, he was taken for ten days to Vinkovtsy; upon returning from Vinkovtsy to Dol, the said private again refused to dig trenches, although the Austrians convinced him that the trenches being built were intended against the Italians, and not against Russians. After this, Private Alekseev was again taken away from Dolya to an unknown destination, and his further fate is unknown. The behavior of the said rank of the Russian army made a strong impression on both our prisoners and the Austrians. An officer at the prison where Private Alekseev was imprisoned brought out the imprisoned Austrians and, calling them “internal enemies of the state” for their unworthy behavior, set them up as an example of the Russian Alekseev, who had shown such deep devotion to his Motherland.”

I will give one more document characterizing the attitude towards our enemy’s prisoners. “On March 20, a scout of the 1st Army, a former reserve, junior non-commissioned officer of the 141st Mozhaisk regiment, Porfiry Panasyuk, who had fled from the Germans, arrived at the headquarters of the 1st Army, with a cropped right ear and a mutilated nose,” says the order of the commander-in-chief of the armies of the North. Western Front of General M.V. Alekseev. - According to Panasyuk’s testimony, he was captured by the Germans on the night of March 15-16 north of Myshinets, from where they were taken to Rossov, apparently to some German headquarters. There, in the presence of ten German officers, he was offered to spy for the Germans for a monetary reward, and first they began to force him to give information about the location of our troops. Panasyuk’s categorical refusal was followed by a threat from the German officers that if he persisted, his ears and nose would be cut into pieces, his eyes would be gouged out and, finally, he would be hanged by his feet. The threat did not shake Panasyuk’s courage; he again refused to give any information about our troops.

Then one of the officers ordered scissors to be brought and began brutal torture. With my own hands, I first cut off the lobe of my right ear, then sequentially, four times over the course of an hour, I cut around the auricle, leaving a small cartilage around the ear canal; at the same time, another officer mutilated the nose with his hand, separating the cartilage from the bones, while simultaneously punching the teeth. Courageously and selflessly enduring torture, Panasyuk stubbornly continued to refuse [to answer] the questions asked of him about our troops. Having failed to achieve success with more than an hour of torture, the interrogating officer ordered Panasyuk to be taken under arrest. On the way, Panasyuk, taking advantage of the darkness of the night, escaped from the convoy accompanying him and went to the front of our troops, from where he was taken to the headquarters of the 1st Army, and then to the infirmary of the Red Cross community in Warsaw. For the courage, perseverance and dedication shown under the torture of our enemies in the name of the oath and loyalty to duty and the Motherland, the commander of the 1st Army awarded Panasyuk the St. George Cross of the 4th degree and a monetary allowance.”

Russia tried not to leave its prisoners in trouble. Humanitarian aid was organized for Russian soldiers and officers who were in German and Austrian camps, and delegations were sent to examine the situation of Russian prisoners of war. The autobiographical stories of V.V. Korsak (Zavadsky) tell well about the life of Russian soldiers and officers in German camps. As an officer of the 171st Kobrin Infantry Regiment, in November 1914 he was wounded and captured. Throughout almost the entire war (until February 1918), he was in the Munich prisoner of war camp in Germany, which he described in the stories “Captive” and “Forgotten,” republished in modern Russia.

But we must not forget that not only Russian military personnel were captured. An even larger number of enemy soldiers and officers were captured by the Entente allies. The number of German prisoners of war was almost 1 million, Austro-Hungarian - 2.2 million. By 1918, there were almost 2 million former military personnel of the German, Austrian, Turkish and Bulgarian armies in Russian captivity.

One of the leaders of the White movement, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army in Crimea, General Pyotr Nikolaevich Wrangel.
In 1914, for a feat accomplished near the village of Kaushen (East Prussia), Captain Wrangel became the first officer in the Great War to be awarded the Order of St. George (IV degree) - What was the state of the Russian army and society by 1917?
— Russia was better prepared for the 1917 campaign than for the previous ones. Errors were taken into account both in strategic planning and in the logistics of the army. For Russia, the fact that in September 1916 the ice-free port of Romanov-on-Murman (renamed Murmansk in April 1917) was founded on the northern coast of the Kola Peninsula was also of great importance. By November 1916, the construction of the Murmansk railway, connecting the seaport with Central Russia, was completed. Allied convoys could now arrive in Russia year-round.

In all the major battles of 1916 (at Verdun in France, in Trentino in Italy, in Eastern Galicia on the Eastern Front), the Entente forces achieved great victories. By the beginning of the 1917 campaign, England, France and Russia were increasingly superior to the countries of the Quadruple Alliance both in the number of troops (14 million versus 7.3 million people), and in weapons and logistics. After the United States entered the war in April 1917[3], the advantage of the Entente became even greater. The strategic initiative passed to the Entente allies - 1916 finally undermined the military and economic power of Germany and its allies. The High Command of the Entente countries intended to carry out coordinated major strikes on the Russian and French fronts, which would result in the final defeat of the Quadruple Alliance by the end of the coming year.

The Russian army was well prepared for the spring offensive of 1917. During the winter respite, the acting chief of staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, General V.I. Gurko, reorganized the army, which made it possible to reduce the number of soldiers on the front line (as a result, losses were reduced), while increasing the firepower of the divisions. Unlike previous years, there were sufficient rifles and ammunition for the 1917 campaign.

Victory in the war was just around the corner. To achieve it, one last effort remained to be made. But despite all the readiness of the Russian army for new battles in the country itself, there was obvious fatigue of the population from the war. It probably would not be critical if political stability was maintained. But the political situation in the country was rocked both by Duma parties and figures, and by the not always thoughtful actions of the government itself. Expectations of a quick victory, unfortunately, were not destined to come true. February 1917 arrived. The anti-government rhetoric of many Duma politicians, who later became members of various compositions of the Provisional Government, played a significant role in the events of February 1917. None of the facts of treason that were spoken about from the high tribunes of the Duma could be proven later by the new government.

— The February events, as you know, were the beginning of the collapse of the army and the country. Did the “golden German key of the Bolsheviks,” to use the expression of S.P. Melgunov, play a role in their preparation?

— The February Revolution, of course, was a gift for Germany, but it did not play any noticeable role in these events themselves. Of course, German agents carried out underground work in Russia, but the practical results were much more modest than the consequences of the February events. Germany's participation was significant already for the Bolsheviks coming to power in October 1917 and, partly, in the subsequent Civil War. Here I can direct readers both to the works of S.P. Melgunov, the memoirs of B.V. Nikitin “Fatal Years,” and to the books of modern researchers.

As the Chief of Staff of the German Army, General E. Ludendorff, noted in his memoirs, after October 1917, “our government’s trust in the Bolsheviks... reached such an extent that it promised Mr. M. Joffe (plenipotentiary representative of Soviet Russia in Berlin - R.G.) supply of weapons and ammunition." One of the most famous facts of German support for the Bolsheviks in the Civil War was the participation of German officers in the suppression of the Yaroslavl uprising in July 1918. It is known that the Yaroslavl rebels, led by General P.P. Karpov, realizing the danger of continuing resistance for the population of Yaroslavl, mercilessly fired upon by the Bolsheviks, surrendered on July 21 to the German Prisoner of War Commission No. 4, led by Chief Lieutenant Balk. In the appeal “to the civilian population of the city of Yaroslavl”, signed by the latter, it was stated that “the Commission will transfer the headquarters as prisoners of war of the German Empire to its immediate superiors in Moscow, where everything further will be given.” What the vague formulation “where everything further will be given” meant became clear the very next day. Balk handed over the entire rebel headquarters and many ordinary participants to the Soviet Emergency Headquarters of the Yaroslavl Front.

This is how Balk himself described his participation in the “Russian Troubles” in an interview with the Russian emigrant newspaper “Vozrozhdenie”: “I know Russia well. I worked there for three years. There were about twenty of us. Some were “captured,” others made their way through other means. I myself - through Finland. Everyone spoke the language: many lived in Russia before the war, and everyone took a repeated practical course before their deployment. They trained me in more than one language: I probably knew by heart the plans and names of the streets of several cities where I was supposed to work. They taught other things too. Bauer himself (an officer in the intelligence department of the German General Staff - R.G.) did the last check and gave me instructions. By his order, upon arrival in Russia, I came under the direct supervision of our agent (Major) Titz... Before the Bolshevik coup, I worked in Kronstadt. I had two main agents for the disintegration of personnel, who worked excellently at first, and then began to think of themselves and in the end completely got out of hand - Mikhelson and Roshal (Chairman of the Kronstadt City Committee of the RSDLP (b) after February 1917. - R.G. ). They were given in the summer of 1917 by the old revolutionary Natanson (M. Natanson - a revolutionary populist, one of the founders and a member of the Central Committee of the Socialist Revolutionary Party, shared the Bolshevik conviction of the need to escalate the world war into a civil war - R. G.), with whom Bauer connected us even before the business trip (I met Nathanson in Zurich). After the October Revolution, for some time I was in the commandant’s office of Smolny under the name of the former cornet Vasilevsky. Tietz was in Moscow during the days of the coup and there he organized shelling of the Kremlin - he is an artilleryman. Then I had to work together with him: we pacified the Yaroslavl uprising. He personally directed the gun fire, I commanded the battery... Quite a few bell towers were knocked down! I’ll boast: if it weren’t for our organization, it’s still unknown what the situation would have turned out to be!”

— What consequences did the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty have for the country, which even its creator Lenin called “obscene”?

— The conclusion of a peace treaty with the countries of the Quadruple Alliance in March 1918, notorious to descendants as the Brest-Litovsk or “obscene” peace, became one of the first foreign policy steps of the Soviet government. The signing of peace allowed the Bolsheviks to retain power in the country in an extremely difficult situation for them and to crush political opponents. But this agreement with an external enemy, with whom Russia has been engaged in a bitter struggle for the past four years, has come at a heavy price for the country. According to the peace treaty ratified on March 15 by the IV Extraordinary Congress of Soviets, the Baltic states and part of Belarus were torn away from Russia; in Transcaucasia, Kars, Ardahan and Batum went to Turkey. Ukraine and Finland were recognized by Soviet Russia as independent states. The territory of the former Russian Empire with an area of ​​about 1 million km2 was subject to occupation, where about a third of the country’s total population lived and approximately half of all industry was located. In addition, the Council of People's Commissars undertook to demobilize the army (including the newly formed units of the Red Army), and the ships of the fleet were obliged to leave for Russian ports and disarm. The customs tariffs of 1904, which were extremely unfavorable for Russia, in favor of Germany, were also restored.

But even more unfavorable for the country was the signing on August 27, 1918 in Berlin, in addition to the previously concluded Brest-Litovsk Treaty, of a Russian-German treaty and a financial agreement, according to which Russia guaranteed the payment of war indemnity to Germany in the amount of 6 billion marks. In addition, Germany was provided with a quarter of the oil and oil products produced in Baku. Germany continued to occupy the Donetsk coal basin, while Russia was given the opportunity to receive coal in the amount of 3 tons per ton of oil and 4 tons per ton of gasoline. It also provided for the transfer to Germany of almost the entire combat personnel of the Black Sea Fleet, including the most powerful and modern ships - the dreadnoughts Empress Catherine the Great, Emperor Alexander III, as well as Novik-class destroyers, which only a few similar ships could compare with classes of foreign countries.

— I would not like to end the conversation about the Great War with the Brest-Litovsk Peace. Please tell us at least about some of the heroes of the First World War - there were a lot of them, but they are remembered much less well than the heroes of the Great Patriotic War. Everyone knows about the Brest Fortress, but how many know about Osovets? Everyone knows the name of Alexei Maresyev, but the name of Yuri Gilsher is unknown to most of our compatriots...

— It is important and necessary to talk about the heroes of the First World War. In the pantheon of Russian glory, next to the defenders of the Brest Fortress should, of course, stand the defenders of the Osovets fortress, which held a siege of superior enemy forces from September 1914 to August 1915, withstanding several enemy attacks. Citizens of modern Russia, of course, should know the names of the first St. George Knight of the First World War, Don Cossack Kuzma Kryuchkov, who destroyed 11 Germans in an unequal cavalry battle, military pilot Yuri Gilsher, who returned to the active army after amputation of his leg and continued to shoot down enemy planes in the sky (awarded next military orders, including St. George IV degree, he died heroically at the age of 22 in an unequal battle of two of our aircraft against 16 enemy aircraft), sister of mercy Rimma Ivanova, who led the soldiers left without officers into the attack and was mortally wounded. This list of heroes can be continued for a long time.

Both officers and many ordinary soldiers showed heroism. Thus, during the First World War, there were many escapes from captivity, both privates and officers. The order for the 3rd Cavalry Corps, given by its commander, General Count F.A. Keller in December 1915, is characteristic: “Today, the ensign of the 10th Uhlan Odessa Regiment Penzar, wounded in the battle near Kotuman and captured there, returned from Austrian captivity. The first time he fled from outside the city of Vienna, where the Austrians had taken him. Near Budapest, he swam across the Danube and, hiding, walked 400 miles to the Romanian border, where he was again captured by the Austrians. Sent to work on the Serbian front, ensign Penzar fled again and returned to Russia through all of Serbia and Romania to his native regiment. Honor and glory to the brave lancer! May God give us more such heroes! I award Lieutenant Ensign Penzar as already having three degrees of the St. George Cross with the St. George Cross of the 1st degree and order him to be nominated for ensign.” Behind a few lines of this order is the feat of a man who made a difficult escape from enemy captivity, traveling several hundred kilometers in order to return to his regiment.

The example of the heroes of the First World War is extremely important for the patriotic education of youth. The fact that almost nothing was known about them from the school history course is our misfortune. It’s good that in the historical and cultural standard of school education, approved at the beginning of 2014 by the country’s leadership, the First World War is finally given significantly more space than before. I hope that in the year of the centenary of its beginning, we will be able to get acquainted with a large number of good publications by modern historians, which will allow us to more fully imagine the picture of what was happening on its fronts, and better get to know its heroes.

Journal "Orthodoxy and Modernity" No. 29 (45)

Oksana Garkavenko

LiveInternetLiveInternet

In light of the approaching 100th anniversary of the start of the First World War, which we will celebrate on August 1, 2014, NV is launching a new special project - “The Great War. 1914–1918." Over the coming months, our newspaper will publish articles by historians, philosophers, military experts and various archival materials related to one of the largest armed conflicts of the twentieth century. The series of publications opens with the reflections of Natalia Alekseevna NAROCHNITSKAYA, Doctor of Historical Sciences, President of the Historical Perspective Foundation.

– On the eve of the 100th anniversary of the First World War, it is with regret that we have to admit that the memory of this most important event for our country occupies an undeservedly modest place in Russian historical consciousness. What is the reason? Of course, the fact that the First World War was eclipsed by two revolutions in Russia and the Great Patriotic War, the Great Victory of May 1945, achieved by a national super-effort unprecedented in history, played a role. However, in terms of the degree of influence on the further course of Russian and world history, the events of 1914–1918 are of enormous importance, predetermining the future Second World War.

But the main reason for the undeserved oblivion of the First World War in the Russian consciousness is that it was subjected to distorted, ideologized interpretations in Soviet times. If you look at school and college history textbooks starting from the 1920s, they describe this war as “imperialist,” “unfair,” and “unnecessary to the people.”

The reason is obvious. In line with the revolutionary historical “Pokrovsky school” and the Institute of Red Professorship, which laid the foundation for the class approach to history, everything that happened before the revolution was declared an archaic struggle for false and hostile interests to the “working people.” And most importantly, it was necessary to justify Lenin’s slogan: “The defeat of one’s own government in the war” - the catalyst for the world proletarian revolution. This morally dubious thesis could only be justified by declaring the First World War a “criminal imperialist massacre.”

It is not surprising that after decades of indoctrination, the memory of the First World War has largely been erased from the Russian historical consciousness. We hardly remember or honor the heroes who died in battles for the honor and dignity of the Fatherland. Only occasionally Alexey Brusilov is mentioned, and only thanks to his later switching to the side of the Bolsheviks. We almost completely lack monuments related to the events of 1914–1918. Rare exceptions are a stele erected in 2008 in Tsarskoe Selo near St. Petersburg and a memorial stone in the Kaliningrad region on the miraculously preserved mass graves of participants in fierce battles throughout their history.

Today, in connection with the approaching centenary of the First World War, there is an opportunity to learn how to view this “Second Patriotic War” in a panoramic manner, while maintaining involvement and not glossing over anything. It is necessary to carefully restore the memory of those events, subjecting ideologically motivated assessments to revision. And to do this, first of all, we have to dispel the most persistent and destructive myths that prevent us from properly appreciating the feat of our ancestors and realizing the true significance of the events of 1914–1918 for the history of Russia.

But what myths are we talking about? Myth No. 1. Russia should not have gotten involved in this war

Some dashing “experts” in history like to replicate the thesis: “Russia’s participation in the First World War is stupidity and a tragic mistake that could have been avoided.” Or: “We should not have interfered in this massacre to save Serbia.” What can I say? One cannot escape the impression that such assessments are a mixture of naivety and a self-confident desire to put forward an antithesis to the dominant point of view.

Being one of the most active participants in the “European concert of powers,” Russia could not stay away from events of such a scale that were unfolding right at its borders and in the region of its responsibility and security - in the Balkans and the Straits (Bosphorus and Dardanelles. - Ed. .). And this is not at all a matter of the “imperialist” desire to gain new markets and the idea of ​​seizing Constantinople falsely attributed to Russia. Russia had its own, not yet developed, internal market, which promised to become European in scale, and therefore was not in a state of intense economic rivalry with other states.

And our country had no territorial claims at all. The specific goal of capturing Constantinople was never set. Yes, there was a dream - to erect an Orthodox cross on St. Sophia! (Looking at how the Turks today are not embarrassed to celebrate the enslavement of Constantinople with fireworks, you can’t help but daydream about it...) But geopolitically this would only be necessary so that we could not block the Straits. At the same time, Russia has always been aware that the capture of Constantinople is practically impossible and would cause such unanimous rejection of the leading Western European powers, especially England, that no fabulous military power would help to overcome it.

There is only a note from diplomat Alexander Nelidov to the sovereign dated 1896, where he reflects on the chance and possibility of taking Constantinople. This note was “sucked up” by denouncers of the “aggressive policy of tsarism” from the Institute of Red Professors. However, the fact is that at the ministerial meeting she caused a purely negative attitude! The sovereign himself left a remark: “IF it were possible!” At the meeting they discussed the danger for Russia of a crisis in Ottoman Turkey, which would immediately cause the fleets of Western European powers to enter the Bosporus. The task was set, given this development of events, to at least catch up with everyone so as not to be forced out!

According to documents, and not speculation, the issue of Constantinople began to be considered again during the war. In 1915, when the question of dividing Turkey’s Arabian possessions and protecting Orthodox Christians in former Turkish territories arose between England and France, England, by the way, had already bargained for control over the oil-bearing Mosul and Kuwait. So the concern for “democracy in Iraq” has very old and very mercantile underpinnings! Russia then began to probe the possibilities of a strong and responsible presence in Constantinople. But the achievable configuration was seen not by individual control, again, but by international control, “but with Russian guns on the Bosphorus.” By the way, some historians believe that after agreeing to this option, England begins to finance the revolution in Russia, so as not to fulfill its promise...

By the beginning of the 20th century, strategic aspirations converged on Russia’s European maritime borders in Eastern and Southeastern Europe and persisted until the beginning of the 21st century. The interests of the formed triangle of Britain, Russia and Germany collided in the Balkans, in the Straits region, as well as in the Baltic, where Germany was attracted by its ambitions in the East and where, after the First World War, the interests of Britain and the United States immediately appeared.

The inevitability of Russia's involvement in the First World War was determined by the critical need to protect the results of its centuries-old history! She was threatened with the loss of the results of three hundred years of work on the northwestern and southern borders, strategic exits to the Baltic and Black Seas, and the loss of the right of passage through the straits. It is not for nothing that the outstanding Russian diplomat Alexander Gorchakov once said that the Black Sea straits are light powers, by blocking which it is easy to strangle Russia.

The Central Powers, led by the Kaiser's Germany, sought both "Drang nach Osten" and "nach Süden" - dreaming of access to the warm Mediterranean Sea through the Balkans and ousting Russia from the Baltic and the Straits region. The success of such a plan would allow the Germans to cut Europe along the strategic meridian from sea to sea, throwing Russia into the tundra and the French into the Atlantic. Kaiser Wilhelm intensively built a fleet and a Berlin-Baghdad railway, which threatened to devalue England's sea routes to the oil regions of the Middle East.

Of course, Russia could not watch these events indifferently, because such a prospect would mean the end of the status of a great power and the subsequent loss of independence. As for supporting Serbia of the same faith, we could not leave it to the mercy of fate not only for religious, but also for strategic reasons. If it were captured, we would have to face a war that was not started by us in more unfavorable conditions - the capture of the Balkans would create a strategic bridgehead, and the Kaiser would create a “Berlin Caliphate”, becoming the gatekeeper of the Straits instead of the Turkish Sultan. And don’t forget that Germany declared war on Russia, and not vice versa! Myth No. 2. Russia’s actions were determined only by geopolitics

However, the movement towards the First World War, in addition to purely geopolitical goals, also had ideological underpinnings. A huge number of communist, social democratic, Masonic, liberal organizations did not think about national interests, but dreamed of the collapse of political systems and traditions in order to bring the world to a single model on the ruins of the old world. Representatives of these “progressive” circles were distinguished by fierce hostility towards the church, Christianity, traditional values, monarchy and state sovereignty - all that they considered attributes of the “dark past”.

Moreover, such ideas were equally characteristic not only of the Bolsheviks with their project of the proletarian international. Countless secret societies directly hoped that bloody clashes would turn Europe into a “blank slate” on which, after the collapse of Christian monarchies, it would be possible to draw new ideological postulates for the future of the world.

Of course, Russia could not remain aloof from these processes either. Being an Orthodox monarchy, during the First World War it defended the ideals of traditional Europe - classical international law, national sovereignty, religious and family values. Even the formation of a Franco-Russian union for Russia - a stronghold of Christian statehood - was complicated by the republican status of “godless” France, which had to be made “union-capable” in the eyes of Russia! For the sake of rapprochement between Paris and St. Petersburg, the Vatican had to work hard, for which the emergence of a Russian-French alliance was a desirable scenario. At his suggestion, the cardinals began to sing greetings to the French Republic, which, by the way, shocked many devout Catholics.

Russia did not seek war, this is a fact. At the origins of the idea of ​​disarmament, international peacekeeping efforts and arbitration was the Russian Emperor Nicholas II, driven by a deep awareness of the coming era, when war became not a continuation of politics by other means, but the greatest world disaster, the death of millions of people, which made even victory meaningless. And unlike US President Woodrow Wilson, who, with his XIV-Point Program, disguised the task of dictating his terms through international mechanisms from the position of his colossally increased strength, there was nothing like that in the minds of the noble sovereign.

Thus, in the First World War, Russia fought for its borders, for their security, for its already acquired access to the sea, for the sovereignty, faith and fate of Christians. Myth No. 3. Russia should have taken the side not of the Entente, but of Germany

Another popular myth is that during the First World War, Nicholas II allegedly chose the wrong ally, which ultimately led to the national tragedy of 1917. Russia should have fought on the side of Germany, not the Entente! Some in their fantasies believe that Russia was ready during the war for a separate peace with Germany... Of course, today we can only lament the fact that Russian-German relations in the 20th century were blown up by two terrible German campaigns in the East. After all, there has been very fruitful cooperation between Russia and Germany for centuries. It is not for nothing that a persistent, albeit small, Slavophile movement remains in German culture today.

But speculation does not stand up to criticism. One cannot ignore the fact that Germany’s main geopolitical ambitions lay precisely in the East. Yes, the legendary Otto von Bismarck bequeathed under no circumstances to fight with Russia. His words are known: “We have no enemies in the East.” But for some reason, German militaristic circles, these chicks of Bismarck’s nest, looked only to the East, forgetting about the wise warnings of the “Iron Chancellor”.

Already twenty years before the First World War, in a secret note by a prominent diplomat, the future Chancellor Bernhard von Bülow, it was written: “In a future war, we must push Russia away from the Pontus Euxine and Baltic Seas. From the two seas that gave her the position of a great power. We must destroy its economic positions for at least 30 years and bomb its coastlines.” What does this mean? War with Russia was considered inevitable in Berlin back in the nineties of the 19th century!

The views of Kaiser Wilhelm, who hated the Slavs, speeches in the Bundestag, and the geopolitical doctrine of Friedrich Naumann are known, indicating the territorial ambitions of Kaiser Germany specifically in the east of Europe and in relation to the Russian Empire. There is a map of the pan-Germanists of 1911 (by the way, it is very reminiscent of the map of NATO expansion to the East), on which the super-German formation includes the Baltic possessions of Russia, Ukraine, all of Eastern Europe, the Balkans to the Black Sea. Finally, one cannot help but recall the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty concluded by the Bolsheviks: it shows for what purposes Berlin waged the war.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the exorbitant ambitions of Austria-Hungary and Germany led to the collapse of Kaiser Germany and Austria-Hungary. The lesson was not learned, and Hitler repeated the suicidal onslaught. In Germany, some minds still wonder how a gifted and rapidly developing nation with a gigantic cultural potential could be blinded by monstrous ambitions and erroneous geopolitical calculations? In his memoirs, the penultimate tsarist Minister of Foreign Affairs S.D. Sazonov believed that, even if the Germans had not imagined themselves to be masters of the world at the beginning of the twentieth century, their rapid economic growth, the talent of industrialists and engineers, coupled with the ability to work effectively, would have put forward the Germany would take the first roles in Europe.

However, the rapprochement between Russia and Germany - a factor in the stability of continental Europe - has caused a real nightmare for the Anglo-Saxons from the beginning of the twentieth century until the present day. America created the same NATO bloc not only against the USSR, which did not at all strive to advance into Western Europe, barely coping with the acquired zone of control in Eastern Europe. One of the goals of European integration was to dissolve and fetter Germany's historical potential and will. Myth No. 4. Russia fought unsuccessfully

Another “class” assessment from Soviet textbooks is widely known: “Russia in 1914 was a stagnating despotism, backward compared to other great powers and doomed to defeat.” However, experts have proven with documents that acute difficulties in the economy and finances during the war were not an exclusively Russian phenomenon. Currency devaluation, rising public debt, the food crisis and the rationing system were all phenomena observed in other countries participating in the war, including Germany and the UK. Russia's position was by no means worse than others.

A separate conversation concerns prejudices about the Russian army, which supposedly did not know how to fight and, with rare exceptions, acted unsuccessfully. The most victorious armed forces are not immune to mistakes and defeats. As for the unsuccessful offensive in East Prussia at the very beginning of the war, it was undertaken by Russia in response to the pleas of the French government. The words of Marshal Ferdinand Foch are well known: “If it were not for the sacrificial performance of the Russians on the Eastern Front, Paris would have been taken in the very first months of the war.”

Yes, Russia did not want war and met the First World War in far from the best shape, having been weakened by the revolution of 1905–1907 and the Russo-Japanese War. It was just beginning to recover from crises, and its armed forces were in the process of being renewed.

And yet, it was on the Eastern Front that the final victory was secured! Russia showed the strength of its national character and loyalty to its obligations, our soldiers and officers showed miracles of valor and selfless service to the oath even after the collapse of the Russian Empire (Russian Expeditionary Force in France). And many operations were included in textbooks as examples of military-strategic art, for example, the famous Brusilov breakthrough. But even the generally unsuccessful offensive in East Prussia made possible the French victory on the Marne in September and determined the strategic configuration in the subsequent years of the war. In general, the victory of the Entente was paid for with Russian blood. Myth No. 5. Russia was defeated

This conclusion is a clear simplification. Yes, it was during the First World War that the prerequisites for the February and October revolutions matured, which became a national tragedy for our country. However, Russia cannot be considered defeated. Another thing is that the country was not able to take advantage of the fruits of its victory after the Bolsheviks came to power, who removed it from the cohort of winners and left the Entente to create a picture of a new world.

It is not for nothing that Winston Churchill wrote in those years: “We can measure the strength of the Russian Empire by the blows it suffered, by the disasters it endured... Holding victory in its hands, it fell to the ground alive, devoured by worms.”

In this regard, the question arises: why did the powerful patriotic upsurge at the beginning of the war after some time give way to skepticism, fatigue, defeatism and revolutionary fever?

Of course, the sharp change in Russian society’s perception of the First World War is largely due to its protracted nature. Lasting for months away from the homeland, the war inevitably dulls the original impulse. Numerous sacrifices in a foreign land and hardships cannot pass without a trace. The justification for the war was the preservation of traditional values, the honor and dignity of the state. Such eternal, ancient ideals can inspire at the beginning of a war, but then they begin to lose out to furious, specific slogans. We are talking about anti-monarchist, pacifist and revolutionary ideas. Their propagandists trumpeted the “unnecessity of war” and called for revolution.

Internal violent denunciations always play into the hands of the enemy, who did not stand aside and actively sponsored revolutionary activities. The German leadership was interested in supporting the most radical forces in Russia. I saw with my own eyes a photocopy of a telegram from German and Austrian archives, which Kaiser Wilhelm read at breakfast: “Lenin’s transfer to Russia was carried out successfully. Proceeds with the planned activities.” And in the State Archive of the Russian Federation there is a document - a receipt for the receipt of five million gold marks for the activities of the Bolsheviks. The German archive also contains orders to “allocate 10”, then “15”, “20” million gold marks under Article 6 of the emergency budget for revolutionary activities in Russia.

Thanks to generous financial injections, the Bolsheviks, Social Revolutionaries and separatists received great opportunities. Their agitators permeated the army, which after the February Revolution was “democratized” to such an extent that the officers actually lost control over the soldiers. As a result, one agitator was enough for one regiment to degrade spirit and discipline to the point of insubordination.

However, I am not one of those who believes that revolution can be brought from outside. However, when the country is on the rocks, external influences are of great importance in determining which forces will prevail...

The two Russian revolutions of 1917 were the result of those deep processes that began to tear Russia apart at the beginning of the 20th century. The revolutionary intelligentsia at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries demanded a copy of Western European institutions, born of the philosophy of progress, which did not fit well with the religious basis of the Russian state idea and the Russian autocracy, which, without the support of the elite and separated from the people, was losing its creative potential. The extreme nihilism of the Russian intelligentsia prompted them to mercilessly trample on everything that Russia defended in the First World War - the Orthodox faith, the monarchy, the tradition of law-abiding, the ideals of serving the Fatherland.

The first crisis, aggravated by economic realities and the Russo-Japanese War, ended with the first Russian revolution, the October 17 Manifesto and constitutional reforms. Why was the ten-year activity of the State Duma of the Russian Empire unable to prevent the February Revolution and the October Revolution? Did the deputies and parties of those convocations of the Duma want to prevent this? They, not only the left radicals - Bolsheviks, Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries, but also the Cadets, liberals of all stripes - wanted to destroy, not create. In the last years before the First World War, Russia developed by leaps and bounds. In steel smelting, railway construction, book printing and the number of students per capita, Russia was already catching up with Germany. But rapid modernization tore the social fabric, it burst from overstrain, and the conservative peasantry, falling out of its world, did not find new social connections. There was a massive lumpenization of the population, and the lumpen were easy prey for revolutionary propaganda. The revolutionary explosion was largely due to too rapid changes. It is impossible to pour new wine into old wineskins!

And the former (only?) Duma members needed the platform to aggravate public antagonisms, and not to protect the state - they learned to value it only in emigration. The great reformer Stolypin threw this at them: “You need great upheavals, but we need a great Russia!”

While the Russian army shed blood for the territorial integrity of the Fatherland, from the rostrum they shouted against the “incomprehensible war” and the “decayed” army in favor of separatists of all stripes (familiar?), often paid from abroad by the oligarch and first political strategist of the revolution Parvus on funds of the General Staff of Kaiser Germany.

All the signs of a crisis era were evident, when people, in the ecstasy of change, begin to break the core on which everything rests. And this passion for self-destruction befell the Russian Empire at the height of the First World War, when Russia actually already held victory in its hands.

Summary

The memory of the First World War is important for Russian society because it allows us to understand very important and fundamental things: “Why did we have to fight in the twentieth century? What goals and values ​​of national existence do we need to defend in order to continue ourselves in history?” After all, at the beginning of the 20th century, Russia faced such internal political and geopolitical challenges that surprisingly repeated themselves at the turn of the 21st century. Restoring the historical memory of the war of 1914–1918 can awaken the lost sense of continuity of our history and protect us from repeating mistakes.

Perhaps one of the main lessons of the First World War is one obvious but bitter truth: it is impossible to start disputes about the structure of the state in the rear of a domestic war with an external enemy. A nation that is able to put aside such disputes for a while for the sake of preserving the Fatherland wins and continues itself in history, retains the opportunity to argue further. If a nation splits at a turning point, this inevitably leads to the collapse of statehood, huge losses and fratricidal civil clashes.

The outcome of our sacrifice in the First World War teaches us that external challenges must unite the nation. It is sinful and vile to use difficulties for domestic political purposes. In addition, many of the processes that are painful for us today (NATO expansion) are easier to understand if we know the geopolitical and ideological background of the First World War, especially since the forceful arrows of pressure on Russia during that war were surprisingly repeated in the 1990s.

We still cannot find unity on many issues of the past, present and future, which is very dangerous for the nation. But if, holding on to the thread of history, we return to 1914, then we again become a united people without a tragic split. Therefore, we must re-examine the First World War, which will give us a vision of the geopolitics of the twentieth century, and examples of the boundless valor, courage and self-sacrifice of the Russian people. Only those who know history are able to adequately meet the challenges of the future.

// Prepared by Mikhail Tyurkin, Ekaterina Portnova

The First World War is the key to the history of the twentieth century

Report at the scientific and practical conference “War, mortally dangerous for Russia...”, held on October 27-28, 2008 by the Historical Perspective Foundation together with the Library-Fund “Russian Abroad”.
“According to the superficial fashion of our time,” Churchill wrote, “the tsarist system is usually interpreted as a blind, rotten tyranny. But an analysis of the 30 months of war with Germany and Austria should have corrected these facile ideas. We can measure the strength of the Russian Empire by the blows it suffered, by the disasters it survived, by the inexhaustible forces it developed... With victory already in hand, it fell to the ground alive, devoured by worms”[1].

Even judging by this statement, it is difficult not to notice how much our historiography lacks a deep understanding of the First World War. Russian Soviet and post-Soviet historiography, unfortunately, did not pay attention to many aspects that led to the war. And not so much because of scientific negligence - there are examples of excellent work by scientists on documents - but because of a certain ideological constraint. Naturally, the paradigm for understanding historical processes was mainly aimed at that time at highlighting those that, one way or another, promoted the world to change the former socio-political system. Concepts such as “national interests” in relation to the people as a nation - when rich and poor, old and young, man and woman - everyone feels like a single whole, a single successively living organism with common goals, historical experiences, in the Soviet historiography was not encouraged. And therefore, taking into account the enormous research work that, in spite of everything, was done by Russian science in Soviet times, today it is necessary to look at this period of history in a new way, through a different prism. First of all, it must be emphasized that the Russian army during the First World War, or the Second Patriotic War, as it was called at that time, was truly people's. Moreover, it was much more popular than any armies of today's democratic countries, where the elites shy away from serving in them, and the backbone consists of those who simply cannot realize themselves in other areas. In the Russian army of that time, only half of the officers consisted of the nobility. There were also people of other classes as officers. They were promoted to the highest military ranks from the rank and file for awards such as the four Crosses of St. George, which my grandfather was awarded.

The question of the inevitability of the First World War is, of course, rhetorical. Too many powerful forces were interested in it: from governments dreaming of redividing the world, revolutionaries, all kinds of internationals, enemies of the Christian Church, to the Vatican itself, which, together with England, was intriguing against its own spiritual daughter - the Austro-Hungarian monarchy.

A stolen victory or a new look at the First World War. Cycle “Tsarist Russia”

Documentary film from the series Tsarist Russia. Two and a half million Russian soldiers and officers gave their lives for Russia in the 1914 war. But so far our country has not erected a single monument to them. After the revolution of 1917, the exploits and sacrifices of millions of Russian people were consigned to oblivion, all military graves of those times were destroyed, and the events of the First World War, until recently, were presented in Russian history only as a prologue to the great October Socialist Revolution...

But by the beginning of the twentieth century, the main strategic aspirations converged on Russia’s European maritime borders, in Eastern and Southeastern Europe. The interests of the formed triangle - Britain, Russia and Germany - collided in the Balkans, in the Black Sea region, in the region of the straits, as well as in the Baltic.

Doesn't this remind us of today's realities? Don’t we now see a reflection of those very contradictions - the pushing back of Russia from the Baltic, from the Black Sea, from the region of the straits, which have now become naval approaches to the main region of world resources, to the routes for transporting hydrocarbons.

For Russia at that moment it was completely impossible to remain on the sidelines, because its entire three-hundred-year history was collapsing. Subsequent events of the twentieth century prompt us to appreciate the wisdom of the well-known note of Pyotr Nikolaevich Durnovo (he would later be characterized by Soviet historiography as an arch-reactionary) addressed to the Sovereign on the eve of the war, literally on its eve. From this note it is clear that Durnovo foresaw both the revolution and literally everything that Russia would experience. And most importantly, these are the words of Durnovo: “Any sacrifices and the main burden of the war that will fall on us, and the role of a battering ram destined for Russia, punching a hole in the thickness of the German defense, will be in vain. For we are fighting on the side of our geopolitical enemy - Great Britain, which will not allow any serious gains."

The fact that Russia, after the Sarajevo murder, tried with all its might to stay out of war is evidenced by the little-known telegrams of Nicholas II to his dear “cousin Willy” - the German Kaiser Wilhelm II. For example, this: “A shameful war has been declared on a weak country... I foresee that very soon, yielding to the pressure exerted on me, I will be forced to take extreme measures... In an effort to prevent such a disaster as a European war, I beg you, in the name of our old friendship, Do everything possible to prevent your allies from going too far."

A few years earlier, shortly after the Bosnian crisis, the chief of the Austro-Hungarian general staff, F. Conrad von Hötzendorff, noted that an invasion of Serbia by Austria would undoubtedly cause the first Russia to act on the side. And then for Germany there will be a casus foederis - a reason for fulfilling allied obligations.

And 15 years before the First World War, the famous politician of the Kaiser’s Germany, B. von Bülow, who became chancellor in 1906, wrote in his notes: “In a future war, we must push Russia away from the Pontus Euxine and Baltic Seas. From the two seas that gave her the position of a great power. We must destroy its economic positions for at least 30 years and bomb its coastlines.” Such documents make meaningless the rhetoric that the war, as the Bolsheviks wrote in their leaflets, was unnecessary, in vain and incomprehensible. Each of the internal political forces, despising the common interests and fate of their own Fatherland, sought to extract only political benefits from the war. Therefore, the First World War, even in the very alignment of these internal political forces, is a good lesson for today’s politicians. The aggravation of contradictions between the states was brought to its climax by a monstrous campaign against each other in the press, including the Russian one. The Tsar's minister Sazonov condemned the "Germanism" of the Russian press, but it was incomparable with the Russophobic hysteria that began in Prussian newspapers. We must not forget this.

The German historical impulse towards the redivision of the world is usually associated with the name of the “Iron Chancellor” Otto von Bismarck, who left something like a political testament, writing: “We have no enemies in the East.” But Otto von Bismarck understood perfectly well: Russia cannot be conquered! A war with Russia is absolutely impossible: it will be long, protracted, and ultimately lost.

After Bismarck, the creator of a strong Germany, all further development of the political situation in the country took place under the aura of his name. But the impulse that has formed in relation to the East and the Slavs, of course, makes us think about how unbridled ambition ultimately leads only to losses. An example of this is the fate of Germany and Austria after the First and Second World Wars. And we must always remember this too.

As for the Anglo-German contradictions, one cannot help but notice how they are obscured by Western historiography. In fact, Anglo-German rivalry has colored international relations to a great extent since the early twentieth century, including the period after the Second World War. However, this circumstance eluded the field of view of Soviet historiography, which viewed the entire non-socialist, capitalist world as a single whole. By the beginning of the twentieth century, Russia, by its very existence within its new borders, represented an unconditional new force - a force that was considered by Britain as a direct threat to its interests. How many British newspapers wrote that “the Cossack cavalry is about to cross the Pamirs (presumably by crossing the Hindu Kush) and invade the British possessions in India”! The contradictions between England and Russia, which, by all estimates, at the end of the 19th century should have led to some kind of Anglo-Russian clash, were discussed vyingly by both journalism and serious analytics.

However, completely different configurations began to emerge. And the beginning of such changes, according to documentarians, was a letter from the Russian ambassador in Paris, Baron A.P. Morenheim, dated 1886. He, to the surprise of the Russian central department, reported that in the event of a possible clash between France and Germany, England would support France. And this is after three centuries of Britain containing its main rival on the continent - France!

There is nothing paradoxical in the fact that Bismarck partly owes the first successes of his policy to the benevolent attitude of Britain. But his calculations about the longevity of this benevolence were short-sighted. England's policy changed as soon as Germany began to emerge as a leading Central European and then a world highly industrialized and military power.

But in order to contain Germany or prevent its rise, English naval power was not enough. As British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Gray said, for continental countries such as Russia and Germany, defeats at sea are not catastrophic. And for the defeat to be serious, a continental war between continental opponents is needed.

Thus, Britain is clearly interested in a clash between Russia and the Central Powers, which, of course, does not relieve responsibility from other participants in the conflict. This is an extremely interesting topic and one that has received little research. The same, for example, can be said about such a component of the world cataclysm as the religious and philosophical confrontation - the task of destroying the last Christian monarchies in Europe, a complete change in the state concept to rationalistic secular states. For such a “trifle” as the religious and philosophical foundations of history was not present in the scientific thinking of even the most venerable historians.

Of course, historians are obliged not to fall into marginalism and to be careful in their assessments, avoiding vulgar journalistic clichés about the “Masonic conspiracy”, etc. However, one cannot ignore the fact that a huge number of movements, organizations of an ideological, as they would say today, ideological kind sympathized not with their own governments, but with a certain idea of ​​​​bringing the world to an ideal model, born of the rationalistic consciousness of the philosophy of progress, which was disintegrating national communities from within .

For example, in the Franco-Prussian War, all French liberals supported Prussia only because Protestant Prussia for them was a symbol of progress compared to backward Catholic France. Documents testify to this. It is no coincidence that one of the patriarchs of British Balkan studies of the early 20th century, R.W. Seton-Watson (known for a number of serious works on the Eastern Question, one of the burning topics associated with the redivision of the world at the end of the 19th century) wrote that the First World War was both a redivision of the world and the revolutions of 1789 and 1848! He does not mention the theme of the revolution of 1917, because he means shaking the world with the ideas of overthrowing the monarchy and establishing secular republics.

On the maps of the “future”, which were published by strategists 24 years before the First World War, Europe is very similar to today. Instead of Christian monarchies there are secular republics, Bohemia is separated from Austria, Germany is dismembered... In the caricature of that time, all Christian monarchs are depicted being driven to the police station under a Jacobin red cap.

Another map has also been preserved, where instead of Russia it is indicated: “desert”. Obviously, this was not a desert project in the sense of exterminating the population, it was a dream to deprive Russia of its role as a system-forming element and turn its territory into material for the historical projects of others.

We can say that the First World War, with the triangle of Anglo-German-Russian contradictions, the collapse of Russia and the drama of the revolution, led to the fact that the twentieth century became, of course, the century of the Anglo-Saxons. Everything that the German potential failed to achieve during the two world wars was excellently accomplished by the Anglo-Saxons, creating a buffer between the Slavs and the Teutons from small independent states from the Baltic to the Mediterranean Sea, thereby again dividing Europe. It must be said that the plans for the post-war world developed at the Versailles Conference also need new thinking through the study of archives and documentary publications. Even touching the materials and transcripts of the “Council of Ten” of the Paris Conference, which, in fact, developed the Treaty of Versailles, encourages this. A huge role in this project of the future world was played by the group “The Inquiery”, led by Colonel House, this unofficial head of American foreign policy, the alter ego of President Thomas Woodrow Wilson.

But what is astonishing is not even this, but the fact that every day began with the reading of telephone messages from M. Litvinov, a representative of the Bolsheviks, who, having calmly settled down in Stockholm, was an unofficial ambassador of the Bolshevik government and was in constant contact with the Anglo-Saxon rulers of the Treaty of Versailles. Litvinov, in one of his telephone messages, even proposed the annexation of some Russian territories in exchange for the Entente withdrawing its troops from Arkhangelsk and the northern territories, surrendering the White Army to the mercy of the Red Army.

At the same time, at the Versailles Conference, the configurations that were beneficial to Britain were obviously laid out. She could not come to terms with the gains of Peter the Great in the Baltic. Already at Versailles, everything was done to consolidate the loss of the Baltic states by revolutionary Russia. Documents and recordings of negotiations give rise to the feeling that it was then that the Bolsheviks “surrendered” the Baltic states. And that is why the United States did not recognize the restoration of the Baltic republics as part of the USSR until the end. Although until 1917 no one disputed the ownership of these territories by historical Russia. Obviously, the West believed: it was possible to “stand” on what was once promised by the self-proclaimed authorities of the country, note that they were not even recognized by the West at that time and did not control the entire territory.

S. Sazonov, in his memoirs about the First World War, published in 1925, predicted: “What the renunciation of the duty of honor and the renunciation of the covenants of history, imposed on them by the International, cost the Russian people will become clear only to future generations.” And, decades later, in 1991, we experienced a parade of sovereignties that counted their independence precisely from 1918...

It is to our contemporaries that history shows what the shameful Treaty of Brest-Litovsk actually meant for Russia. Then, with one stroke of the pen, Russia lost everything for which it shed blood in the First World War and for which Soviet soldiers later shed blood in the Great Patriotic War.

Durnovo called the brewing world war “mortally dangerous for Russia.” He understood perfectly well that a war in the economic conditions in which Russia found itself would certainly lead to a revolution, and the revolution would spread to Russia’s rival, Germany. And so it happened. A German victory will destroy the German economy, Durnovo wrote in his note to the Emperor, and a Russian victory will destroy the Russian economy. No one will be able to compensate for the damage with reparations. But the main thing is that the peace treaty, in the event of victory, will be dictated by the interests of England, which will not allow any important territorial gains by Russia, except, perhaps, Galicia. And then P. Durnovo warned: “Only a madman can annex Galicia. Whoever annexes Galicia will lose the empire and Russia itself will become little Russia.” His foresight is amazing, because this is exactly what happened in our time, at the end of the 1990s.

Stalin annexed Galicia, forgetting that since 1349 it had not shared its fate with Orthodox Ukraine and represents a completely different cultural and historical type, in which the self-identification of a Ukrainian is “anti-Muscovite.” We are seeing the consequences of this thoughtless step today. The current position of Poland, always restless when it comes to harming Russia, is quite understandable to those who are well aware of the works of Polish pan-Germanists published in Krakow, in Austria-Hungary on the eve of and during the First World War.

True, the founder of the Institute of Red Professorship and Vulgar-Class Sociology in Historical Science, M. Pokrovsky, claims that “the German predator was still smaller and lower flying than his rivals, and the war was directly provoked by the Russian party and the Serbian military, who months before it began were preparing for the division of Austria-Hungary” and, as Pokrovsky hints, were behind the assassination of Franz Ferdinand. He does not mention a word about the German project Mitteleuropa, based on the doctrine and works of pan-Germanists such as Friedrich Naumann, who openly preached in the Reichstag and actively published in Berlin and Vienna. The talk was about the creation of a German superstate with varying degrees of state unity between the foreign territories included in it, right up to the straits and Baghdad. Sazonov called this project the "Berlin Caliphate", in which the Kaiser became the "gatekeeper of the straits" instead of the Turkish Sultan.

Pro-German Poles echoed this doctrine. A professor at the Jagiellonian University in Krakow, von Strazewski, considered it a historical axiom that “Russia, pushed aside on the Pacific Ocean, seized on predatory Western Asian and Pan-Slavic plans, which were prevented by Poland.” According to him, “with its thousand-year affiliation with Western European Christian culture in all areas of public life,” Poland stands immeasurably higher than Russia, which, with its Byzantine-Asian character, is “the most important enemy of all European culture.”

It is worth remembering how today, in an interview in September 2005, the famous modern Polish historian Pavel Vecherkovich expressed regret that Poland did not come to an agreement with Hitler. Then she would have taken part in the parade of victorious Polish-German troops on Red Square. Terminology and thinking have not changed since the First World War: Russia is a “northern bear”, a direct heir to the aggressive aspirations of Tamerlane and Genghis Khan.

However, we must remember that “Poland’s opinion about Russia,” as Engels wrote to Vera Zasulich in the 19th century, “is the opinion of the West.”

Historiography, its tone and emphasis in the twentieth century change surprisingly depending on the ideological and worldview paradigm. During the Cold War, even in historical works they begin to accuse Russia of allegedly being the main culprit for the outbreak of the First World War. The documents, however, tell a different story. Even at the Versailles Conference, when it seemed that all the blame could be placed on the absent Russia, the commission to establish responsibility for the outbreak of the war categorically decided: the First World War was unleashed for the sake of redividing the world precisely by the Central Powers and their satellites.

Russian scientists today urgently need to initiate major historical conferences with Western colleagues. In the scientific community, as can be seen when working abroad, there is, in principle, much more decency and objectivity, a willingness to admit the truth of facts and documents, than in the Western press. Discussions in serious audiences turn out to be both interesting and fruitful.

However, unfortunately, the achievements of Western European science itself are not always reflected in textbooks. They continue to suggest between the lines that Russia is a failure in world history. And in Russia itself, inattention to the study of the period of the First World War led to significant distortions in the historical consciousness of society. But the absence of a continuous historical consciousness is a weakness of any state. When a nation cannot find agreement on any issue of the past, present and future, it is unable to recognize its historical interests and easily succumbs to alien projects and ideas. But navigable rivers and ice-free ports, access to the sea are equally needed by the monarchies of the 18th century and the republics of the 20th, by communist regimes and democracies of the 21st.

The split in society before the First World War largely predetermined the losses and losses that we suffered after the revolution. The Russian people, instead of, as stated in the manifesto of Nicholas II, “repelling, rising as one man, the daring onslaught of the enemy,” forgetting all internal strife, on the contrary, they drowned in polyphonic disputes about the structure of the state, betraying the Fatherland, without which, by definition, there may be no state.

The results of the First World War laid down the balance of forces of the twentieth century - the century of the Anglo-Saxons, which Germany, stung by the results of the Versailles Conference, wanted to break. After all, when the text of the Versailles Peace Treaty was made public, it was a shock for the Germans. But instead of comprehending their sins and errors, ups and downs, they gave birth to Hitler’s doctrine of the natural heterogeneity of people and nations, a justification for unbridled expansion, which finally discredited the German historical impulse in the eyes of the world to the great satisfaction of Britain and the United States. The Anglo-Saxons forever “ordered” the Germans the idea of ​​the unity of all German lands, which is now a nightmare for the politically correct historical consciousness.

In the age of universal human values ​​and computerization, when the microchip has replaced Shakespeare, Goethe and Dostoevsky, the factor of strength and the ability to influence, as we see, remains the basis for strategic control over territories, resource-rich regions and sea approaches to them. This is precisely what the policies of the great powers attest to in the early 21st century, although these powers prefer to think of themselves as “great democracies.” However, in international relations there is much less democracy than successive geopolitical constants. In the 1990s, Russia temporarily renounced the sense of its geopolitical mission and abandoned all the traditional foundations of its foreign policy. And while its political elite reveled in the “new thinking,” the whole world willingly took advantage of the old one.

The lines of force that are now pushing Russia back to the northeast of Eurasia are surprisingly similar to those that appeared before the First World War. This is the throwing of Russia into the tundra, away from the Baltic, from the Black Sea, this is the rejection of the Caucasus, this is the eastern question, which by no means remained in the 19th century.

It was these traditional configurations that were the main content of international contradictions throughout the twentieth century, despite the external side - the rivalry between communism and liberalism. Strategic points on the planet have been the subject of some of the most dramatic clashes at both the diplomatic and military levels. There is nothing new in this world. But only those who know history well are able to adequately meet the challenges of the future.

Notes: [1] Churchill W. The World Crisis. 1916-1918. – NY, 1927. – Vo1. 1. - R.227-229/

Quotes about war

The war would have been a picnic if it weren't for lice and dysentery. Margaret Mitchell

We are told that war is murder. No: it's suicide. Ramsay MacDonald Prologue of the 20th century - gunpowder factory. Epilogue - Red Cross barracks. Vasily Klyuchevsky War is for the most part a catalog of blunders. Winston Churchill What is required of a soldier, first of all, is endurance and patience; courage is the second thing. Napoleon I Soldier is the last link in the evolution of the animal world. John Steinbeck

War is a series of disasters leading to victory. Georges Clemenceau Any war is popular during the first thirty days. Arthur Schlesinger In war there is no second prize for the losers. Omar Bradley

You can't be a good soldier without some stupidity. Florence Nightingale

There are no winners in war, only losers. Arthur Neville Chamberlain Everything is simple in war, but the simplest things are extremely difficult. Carl Clausewitz General is a corporal who has been promoted many times. Gabriel Laub Either humanity will end war, or war will end humanity. John Kennedy If our soldiers understood why we are fighting, no war could be fought. Frederick the Great The fastest way to end a war is to lose it. George Orwell

A British soldier can stand up to anyone but the British Ministry of Defence. George Bernard Shaw The first casualty of war is truth. Johnson Hiram War is too important a matter to be left to the military. Georges Clemenceau

War is a traumatic epidemic. Nikolay Pirogov

Nothing boosts morale like a dead general. John Masters Every war between Europeans is a civil war. Victor Hugo

The worst thing, apart from a lost battle, is a won battle. Duke of Wellington In the final analysis, a soldier's pack is no heavier than the chains of a prisoner of war. Dwight Eisenhower There will be no World War III veterans. Walter Mondale War is the continuation of politics by other means. Carl Clausewitz An officer cannot be a good commander if he is no longer at all afraid of the corporal. Bruce Marshall I do not know of a single nation that has been enriched by victory. Voltaire It is as impossible to win a war as to win an earthquake. Jeannette Rankin Almost every general starts with the soldier and only then takes on the officers. Boguslav Wojnar The flourishing of military sciences is possible only in peacetime. Don Aminado

Anyone who tries to evade his combat duty is not truly crazy. Joseph Heller If the outcome of war could be foreseen, all wars would cease. Karol Bunsch Wars begin when they want, but end when they can. Niccolò Machiavelli Children and generals love to scare others. Wojciech Zhukrowski A career officer is a man whom we feed in peacetime, so that in wartime he can send us to the front. Gabriel Laub How is the world governed and how wars break out? Diplomats lie to journalists and believe their own lies when they read them in newspapers. Karl Kraus

If the enemy does not threaten, the army is in danger. Arkady Davidovich Generals is a striking case of delayed development. Who among us at the age of five did not dream of being a general? Peter Ustinov This war will end wars. And the next one too. David Lloyd George The old men declare war, and the young go to die. Herbert Hoover War is just a cowardly escape from peacetime problems. Thomas Mann The war is only over when the last soldier is buried. Alexander Suvorov

Why are generals so stupid? Because they are recruited among colonels. Jean Cocteau